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Introduction 
This chapter maps out the main structural and policy frameworks which govern
the integration of immigrants in Spain. It offers a clear example of a practical
approach and of ‘multiple diversity’, in which two frameworks interact. The
first of these is an old, unresolved framework, arising from democratic transi ­
tion and based on Kymlicka’s (1995) term ‘plurinational’. The second is a new
framework due to immigration and described as ‘polyethnic’. Spain is also situ­
ated at the geographical border of Europe, allowing important flows of migrants
from the south keen to enter the Schengen space. The multilevel governance
of integration influences the distribution of competence; the fact that multiple
integration policy approaches can coexist, with their own intergovernmental
tensions, makes Spain an exceptional rara avis. In this sense, the country has
become a laboratory for integration in complex institutional settings (Zapata-
Barrero 2010). Understanding how these flows have shaped Spanish society and
how the different levels of administration have incorporated this phenomenon
into their governance agenda is key to understand contemporary Spain (Zapata-
Barrero 2012b). 
The aim in this chapter is to identify the main drivers that may help us to under­
stand these social and structural transformations in Spanish society over the last 
30 years. The first part concentrates on reviewing flows and stocks in order to 
provide a clear overview of who the migrant population in Spain are and how they
become part of Spanish society. The policies related to migrant flows – as part 
of border control – are under the ordinance of central government; however, 
integration policies are under different levels of administration, mainly local 
(autonomous communities or municipalities). The second part analyses how pub­
lic administration has developed a set of instruments and actions to deal with 
these migratory dynamics. Our focus is on integration and inclusion policies from 
a multilevel perspective. Apart from examining the instruments promoted by cen­
tral government, we examine the role of Catalonia, the first autonomous commu­
nity to develop integration tools – and at the local level – even a year before the 
central government did in 1993. 
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The overall purpose of this chapter is to emphasise the paradigmatic case of 
Spain as a multilevel scenario in which integration policies have also been intro­
duced in diverse socio-demographic contexts. 
The demographic factor 
The extraordinary intensity of international immigration in Spain throughout the 
twenty-first century and its no-less-spectacular decline during the economic cri­
sis are perhaps among the best examples of the complex relationship between 
a demographic phenomenon, the economic context and legislation. In order to 
assess this interaction, we keep three elements in mind: 
• the evolution of flows; 
• the characteristics of the immigrant population and its integration into the 
labour force; and 
• spatial distribution. 
Demographic flows: from boom to bust 
Between 1996 and 2017, 10 million arrivals from other countries were reg­
istered in Spain, the high point being in 2007, with a figure of 958,000, after 
which the numbers dropped to a little over half that estimate (64 per cent) in 
2013 owing to the economic crisis. After this, they slowly started to rise again to 
reach 637,000 arrivals in 2017 – similar to the level recorded for 2004 (Cebolla-
Boado and Pinyol-Jiménez 2019). Indeed, in the twenty-first century, until the 
onset of the economic crisis, Spain was one of the countries which received the 
most immigrants from abroad, second only to the United States (Widmaier and 
Dumont 2011). What caused this migratory boom? Several reasons come together 
in the explanation: economic factors (a flourishing economy with a labour mar­
ket based on unskilled workers), demographic influences (a notable rise in lev­
els of educational attainment, especially in generations of women, as well as a 
remarkable increase in life expectancy) and political dynamics (weakness of the 
welfare state and hence an absence of measures for reconciling family and work­
ing life, thereby inducing a large-scale externalisation of reproductive work in the
market – particularly domestic tasks and care of children and the aged). 
Observing how this situation developed, it is not difficult to see how, first, legal 
measures and, second, economic evolution have marked patterns of growth and 
decline. Among the former, some initiatives stand out, especially the impact of the 
extraordinary regularisation measures of 2000, 2001 and 2005. Announcement 
of these measures not only brought to light workers who were already living in 
the country and who now registered as if they had only just arrived but also, in 
some cases, resulted in the much-maligned ‘pull factor’. Nevertheless, there are 
other noteworthy measures, outstanding amongst which is the Schengen Visa. The 
anticipated announcement of a demand for visas from Ecuador in 2001, Colombia 
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flows but also had two striking results: the flows were moved forward during the 
year in question and there was a change in structure by sex and age thereafter as 
a consequence of family reunification. A third legal factor with major – although 
less evident – repercussions in the evolution of international immigration in Spain 
is the advantageous policy giving priority in access to nationality to people com­
ing from Latin America, with a requirement of just two years’ continuous legal 
residence compared with the 10-year period stipulated for immigrants from other 
origins (Domingo and Ortega-Rivera 2015). This policy partly explains why the 
migratory boom consisted of large numbers of people from Latin America, with 
over 3 million arrivals. The fact that this coincided with the pan-ethnic discourse 
of Spanish nationalism after the Partido Popular (PP – People’s Party) led by 
José María Aznar came to power and favoured an ethnically based replacement of 
Moroccan immigrants. One of the inadvertent results of this ‘selection by origin’
(Joppke 2005) has been the thwarting of hopes for upwards social mobility among 
Moroccan immigrants (Domingo 2018). 
Fluctuating numbers of immigrants from European countries are mainly the 
result of EU enlargement. Hence landmarks were established with the first arrival 
of immigrants from Poland in 2004 and later, in 2007, from Romania and Bul­
garia, as shown by the sharp rises in Figure 8.1. 
As for the falling numbers of immigrants in relation to the economic crisis, 
observers tend to agree that the measures taken to facilitate the return of immi­
grants to their respective countries were ineffective (Cachón Rodríguez 2012). 
The vast majority of the 2.4 million returnees or re-migrants between 2008 and 
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Figure 8.1 Arrivals in Spain from abroad showing nationality by general continental ori­
gins, 1996–2017 
Source: Authors, based on Residence Variation Statistics, 1996–2017 (INE – Spanish National Statisti­
cal Institute) 









(ILO 2009). Note that, with all this background, policing pressures in the first few 
months after the Spanish government recognised the situation of crisis, combined 
with the rhetoric which came with austerity policies, were fuelling resentment 
among the Spanish population when immigrants were often presented not only 
as competitors for public services and in the job market but also as fraudsters. 
Measures like that adopted by the Spanish government in 2012 suppressing the 
right to free health care for undocumented immigrants – but not applied by gov­
ernments in some autonomous regions like Catalonia or the Basque Country – or 
cuts in unemployment benefits (which were supported by the regional govern­
ments), using as an excuse the alleged fraud committed by unemployed foreign 
workers, fanned the flames of xenophobic discourse. A final interaction between 
the economic crisis and the legal system with regard to migratory flows took the 
form of increasing numbers of immigrants who applied for Spanish citizenship 
even while planning to emigrate, but now with the security that nationalisation 
offered for a possible return to Spain, mobility in or re-migration to the countries 
of the Schengen Area or moving to other EU countries. 
The recovery of immigrant flows after 2014 mainly features people com­
ing from Latin America and the EU. The composition of the group from Latin 
America, however, points to the importance of expulsion (i.e. a push factor) rather 
than pull factors. Countries with the greatest presence in these rising numbers of 
immigrants are Venezuela (owing to the serious political and economic crisis), 
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala (with increasingly high levels of citizen 
insecurity and the progressive closure of the border with the United States), as 
well as older countries of origin like Argentina (due to the expulsion caused by 
the Macri government’s neoliberal policies). The forced nature of some of these 
migratory movements also explains the rising numbers of applicants for asylum 
in Spain among these immigrants. 
Employability of the immigrant population in Spain: dualisation 
Despite the predominance of immigrants from countries of Latin America, one 
of the characteristics of Spain’s immigrant population is its heterogeneity, even 
among those who have come from this continent. On 1 January 2018 the foreign-
born population residing in Spain numbered 6.4 million or 13.7 per cent of the 
total population. The first ten places in Figure 8.2, showing immigrant origins, are 
occupied by countries from four continents, which are as different as Morocco 
(almost 826,000 people), Romania (around 593,000) and Ecuador (404,000). The 
differences among the groups between immigrants born in the counties of origins 
and those who are citizens thereof are very conspicuous due to the fact that prefer­
ential access to Spanish citizenship was given to immigrants from Latin America. 
Hence, if the difference between the number of people from Morocco and those 
with Moroccan citizenship is only 55,151 people, the figure for Ecuador rises to 
269,139; the disparity is even more extreme in the cases of the Romanian or Chi­
nese populations, among which those who keep their original nationality are more 
numerous than those actually born in those countries. 
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Figure 8.2 Main national origins of the immigrant population residing in Spain, 2018 
Source: Authors, using Official Population Figures, 2018 (INE – Spanish National Statistical Institute) 
As suggested in the earlier discussion of the causes of the migratory boom, 
incorporation into the workplace of these groups of immigrants occurs in a dual­
ised job market. If, at the beginning of this polarisation, during a time of economic 
growth, employment integration acted in a complementary way, similarly favour­
ing the job prospects of young people and university-educated Spanish women –
as happened elsewhere in other countries of the south of the EU (Domingo and Gil 
2007) – it also accelerated market deregulation in such a way that, after the onset 
of the crisis, it exacerbated the differences between people of varying national 
origins. A second characteristic of this labour integration process was the femini­
sation of the workforce, spurred by the demand in the service sector owing to the 
externalisation of child care and domestic work, as mentioned earlier, and this was 
mainly met by female immigrants from Latin America. 
In contrast to Spaniards, the foreign-born population is mostly concentrated 
in the secondary sector, in jobs with minimal educational requirements and low 
salaries. The specialisation into certain job niches brings about acute occupational 
segregation – not only vis-à-vis the autochthonous population but also among 
workers of different origins – together with marked over-qualification. This divi­
sion of labour might be described as what some American authors call ‘segmented 
assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou 1993), although the original concept referred spe­
cifically to the so-called second generation and hence not so much to the immi­
grants themselves but to their descendants. Assimilation into the job market where 
the demand is mainly for unskilled labour – using large numbers of workers with 
a nonlegal status and hence engaged in undeclared work – helped to bring about 
a situation in which the progress made by immigrants is conditioned by earlier 
prejudices held by the Spanish population about people of different origins. What 
frequently occurs is assimilation by downward social mobility, and the economic 





crisis only heightened the probability of this downward movement. Given that 
it is not long since the immigrants arrived, it is difficult to corroborate this trend 
for their descendants, although some school results give the impression that the 
inequality will be reproduced (Bayona and Domingo 2018). 
The effects of the economic crisis deserve separate consideration (Figure 8.3). 
As we have noted, this affected flows, with a drastic drop in the numbers of arriv­
als and a concomitant rise in departures. However, as far as the population is con­
cerned, there are three main consequences which need to be taken into account, 
as they have had a considerable impact on integration policies with regard to 
the available resources, especially at the local level, the illegal status of immi­
grants and unemployment, and, increasingly, household vulnerability. In the case 
of the first effect, one of the earliest austerity measures adopted after the economic 
recession had finally been recognised in May 2012 was the cutting of EU integra­
tion funding which the government had been distributing among the municipal 
coffers. Since local administration was the most directly involved in applying 
integration policies, the effects of the cut were even more adverse. This was due 
to the associated suspension of contracts, in particular among intercultural media­
tors who were working to avoid community conflicts, many of whom were of 
immigrant origin. Besides, when the real estate bubble burst, municipal debt rose 
because local administrators had seen speculation on this market as an easy way 
of boosting the budget. Just at the time when investment in integration policies 
was the most necessary because of the economic situation and also growing sec­
ond generations, this investment either stopped or dropped to alarmingly low lev­
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Figure 8.3 Evolution of unemployment by birthplace, Spain, 2004–2018  
Source: Authors, using the Labour Force Survey, 2Q2018 (INE – Spanish National Statistical Institute)  






















Spanish government took advantage of the economic crisis to recentralise powers 
that had been devolved to the autonomous regions, which then led to new tensions 
between central and local administration at both regional and municipal levels. 
Immigration was one of the bones of contention. 
Second, the crisis had a perverse, unforeseen effect on the system of continuous 
regularisation which, in force since 2006, was known as ‘El Arraigo’ or ‘social 
attachment’, a process consisting of the authorisation for foreigners in an irregular 
situation to live and work in Spain for a year (with the possibility of subsequent 
renewal in the form of a residence permit) – since it was linked with job offers. 
When the possibility of finding work was all but ruled out as an effect of the crisis, 
the individual (but generalised) transitory state of what had been an irregular situ­
ation during the boom years turned into an almost permanent structural element 
of the recession. This meant increasing numbers of people who were suddenly 
relegated to an irregular status because the loss of jobs for immigrants whose 
papers were in order could lead to the loss of the associated permit and hence to 
being condemned once more to an illegal status. Social and humanitarian Arraigo, 
entailing family links living on the municipality as well as a longer period of resi­
dence and close involvement with the community in question, then became the 
main way of achieving a legal status and, accordingly, was much more common 
than the earlier resort of joining the workforce (Sabater and Domingo 2012). 
Third and finally, the impact on unemployment must also be taken into
account. When the real estate bubble burst, the first sector to be hit by the crisis
was the construction industry and its offshoots, a mostly male domain in which
many foreign-born immigrants were employed. Meanwhile, a large percentage of
women working in the service sector or as domestics were better able to resist the
onslaught of the crisis, although they paid the price of having to accept precarious
jobs or going back to work in the informal economy. Accordingly, unemploy­
ment levels rose more among men than among women who, on earlier occa­
sions, were the first to be forced out of the labour market (Domingo and Sabater
2013 Hence, if, in 2007, male unemployment among foreign-born immigrants
was estimated at 13.6 per cent (three points higher than the figure for Spanish
workers), by 2013 it had grown to 35.3 per cent – which was well above the high
figure of 24.3 per cent for Spanish-born workers (Figure 8.3). The effect among
women who, before the crisis, were on record as being economically active (i.e.
Latin American women) was very different to that among women who were not
(mainly African). At a time when their male partners were losing their jobs, more
and more women were registering as jobless, so their unemployment figures rose
sharply in what has been called the ‘addition effect’. Consequently, at the worst
moment, 40.7 per cent of Ecuadorian women were registered as unemployed,
while the percentage of unemployed Moroccan women hit an all-time high of
61.6 per cent (Figure 8.3). 
Unemployment levels began to fall after 2014 but not equally for all origins. 
Not only did they continue to show a considerable difference from the figures for 
the autochthonous population but, in some groups such as unemployed Moroc­
can men, although the figures improved – dropping from 49.4 per cent in 2013 











to 30.4 in 2018, or 19 percentage points – they were still a long way from the 
figures for immigrants born in Ecuador, which went from 46.8 to 19 per cent, a 
drop of 27.8 percentage points, or for Romanians, whose levels of unemployment 
fell by 27.4 percentage points from 43.6 to 16.2 (Figure 8.3). When viewed from 
the standpoint of family vulnerability, these unemployment levels in populations 
like those of Moroccan origin (who, as we have noted, still constitute the largest 
group of foreign-born nationals resident in Spain today), estimated at 30.4 per 
cent for men and 48.3 for women in 2018, give rise to totally anomalous situa­
tions (Figure 8.3). Figure 8.4 gives an approximate illustration of the problem: in 
18.3 per cent of homes in which at least one Moroccan-born person resides, all the 
economically active members of the household are unemployed. 
Spatial distribution: diversity and vulnerability 
The offers on the job and housing markets explain the spatial distribution of 
Spain’s immigrant population. One of the main characteristics of this distribution 
is its dispersal over the territory for the whole immigrant population, although 
some groups, based on national origins and type of employment, tend to be more 
concentrated than others in different parts of the country. By autonomous region 
(see Table 8.1), and in absolute numbers, Catalonia stands out, with more than 
1.38 million newcomers, followed by Madrid with almost 1.22 million and a long 
way ahead of other regions like the Autonomous Community of Valencia, with 
815,000 and Andalusia with 788,000. Relatively speaking, however, the Balearic 
Islands, with 22 per cent of the population consisting of immigrants stand out, 
together with Madrid with 18.5 per cent and Catalonia with 18.2 (Table 8.1). 
This spatial distribution means, first, a change in comparison with Spain’s inter­
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Figure 8.4  Percentage of households where all adults are unemployed, by large continental 
groups, Spain, 2018 
Source: Authors, using the Labour Force Survey, 2Q2018 (INE – Spanish National Statistical Institute) 
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Table 8.1 Total population and foreign-born population by autonomous region, Spain, 
2018 
Total Population Foreign-Born % 
Andalusia 8,384,408 788,101 9.4 
Aragon 1,308,728 167,858 12.8 
Asturias 1,028,244 75,465 7.3 
Balearic Islands 1,128,908 250,794 22.2 
Canary Islands 2,127,685 395,033 18.6 
Cantabria 580,229 49,111 8.5 
Castile and Leon 2,409,164 179,657 7.5 
Castile-La Mancha 2,026,807 198,081 9.8 
Catalonia 7,600,065 1,380,590 18.2 
Autonomous Region of Valencia 4,963,703 815,551 16.4 
Extremadura 1,072,863 44,507 4.1 
Galicia 2,701,743 221,963 8.2 
Madrid 6,578,079 1,219,347 18.5 
Murcia 1,478,509 226,621 15.3 
Navarre 647,554 92,298 14.3 
Basque Country 2,199,088 206,530 9.4 
La Rioja 315,675 43,912 13.9 
Ceuta 85,144 11,046 13.0 
Melilla 86,384 20,439 23.7 
Spain 46,722,980 6,386,904 13.7 
Source: Authors, Spanish Population Register, 2018 (National Institute of Statistics) 
international migration has replaced earlier migrations from elsewhere in Spain, 
in the Basque Country this demographic history has been interrupted and, at the 
other end of the scale, Andalusia came to be a net exporter of workers in the twen­
tieth century. This pattern will somehow become noticeable in attempts to make 
sense of the phenomenon – i.e. when justifying policies applied at the level of the 
autonomous regions. Consequently, while continuity prevails in regions which 
formerly received more immigrants – especially Catalonia, a land of immigrants –
in the case of Andalusia, the situation of new immigrants will be compared with 
the migratory experience (especially in Europe) of generations of Andalusians 
who left their homeland in the 1960s. Moreover, the composition of immigrants 
by origin, sex and age will vary substantially in each autonomous region, thus 
presenting different challenges in the various integration projects. 
At the municipal scale, in absolute numbers, the big cities unsurprising con­
centrate the greatest numbers of foreign-born immigrants. Heading this list are 
Madrid, with 679,000 foreign-born residents, Barcelona with 392,000 and Valen­
cia with 135,000 according to the Spanish Population Register (INE 2018). In 
relative terms, however, the picture is very different: leaving aside very small 
towns, the largest concentrations are found in tourist towns throughout the terri­
tory and especially along the Mediterranean coast: Llíber in Alicante (where 68.9 
per cent of the population is foreign-born), Benhavís in Malaga (64.1) and Adeje 














in Santa Cruz de Tenerife (52.3) (INE 2018) are good examples of clusters mainly 
consisting of retired European immigrants and their compatriots who accompany 
them, or people – usually of British origin – attracted by the job possibilities 
they generate. In these towns of the Alicante region, Andalusia and the Canary 
Islands, one finds not only the highest percentages of such immigrants but also 
much more pronounced segregation in these so-called golden ghettos than that 
found in neighbourhoods of Spain’s big cities. 
The institutional and structural framework 
Immigration has never been a competence defined in the constitutional frame­
work or in any other constitutional law delimiting governance and policy man­
agement. Instead, immigration emerged as an administrative and technical issue 
in the 1990s and as a political and social issue in 2000 (Arango 2000). Spain is 
developing its competence on immigration pragmatically, by taking the policy 
instruments in its administrative and policy structure and constructing its legal 
and regulatory instruments while respecting its already decentralised division 
(Zapata-Barrero 2012a). 
At the beginning of the 2000s, immigration as a topic had entered the Spanish 
political and social agenda. This ‘politicization of immigration’ (Zapata-Barrero 
2003) evidences how migration has become a factual certainty in a country 
with a traditional emigration history. This implied that the main concerns of the 
Spanish migration policy were resolved and that these concerns perhaps remain 
unchanged for the different Spanish governments and administrations (Cebolla-
Boado and Pinyol-Jiménez 2014). Instruments to manage economic migration, 
collaboration with third countries (non-UE) and fighting irregular migration flows 
(mainly via maritime borders) have progressively become crucial topics into the 
Spanish labour market – have been acquiring relevance over the years, but in an 
ambivalent process in which different actions and instruments have been devel­
oped, although lacking a theoretical and shared framework about what integration 
means (Cebolla-Boado and González-Ferrer 2013). 
From national administration to local authorities, integration has become a cru­
cial and wide discussion in which the rights of the migrant population (including 
those in an irregular situation), the management of cultural and religious diver­
sity, opportunities and anti-discrimination measures have been argued with differ­
ent intensities. The absence of a structured model as in other European countries 
(Favell 1998) has been seen, nevertheless, as an opportunity to focus on maintain­
ing social cohesion in a multiply diverse scenario (Zapata-Barrero 2013). Defin­
ing the boundaries of a public philosophy of integration means understanding 
narratives, instruments and actions developed to manage diversity and to guaran­
tee social cohesion and conviviality (convivencia as living together) in a decen­
tralised Spain (Ferrero-Turrión and Pinyol-Jiménez 2009). It has been argued that, 
in the absence of traditions, Spain has followed a practical philosophy (Zapata-
Barrero 2012b) – i.e. a way of managing diversity which is based not on estab­
lished and preconceived ideas, projected by its own social construction, such as 









French republicanism or British multiculturalism but, rather, on questions and 
answers generated by the practice of diversity governance (Carrera 2005, 2006). 
The Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January 2000 on the rights and freedoms of 
foreign nationals in Spain and their social integration1 is the main legal migration 
framework in Spain. It regulates the rights, obligations and liberties of foreign 
citizens, including: 
•  the right to family reunification and legal guarantees; 
•  the conditions for entry into Spanish territory, authorisations to remain, tem­
porary residence (including residence on the basis of family reunification, 
labour or social reasons, humanitarian reasons or other exceptional circum­
stances) and permanent residence; 
•  the specific regimes such as those of students, stateless persons, persons with­
out identity documents, refugees and unaccompanied minors; and 
•  work permits and the annual quota of foreign workers. 
In addition, this law regulates offences in the area of foreigners’ affairs, the regime 
of sanctions and coordination of public authorities, the performance of the Labour 
Inspectorate aimed at controlling working conditions and combating irregular 
employment and labour exploitation, and the support of public powers for immi­
grant associations, groups and organisations in support of immigration. 
Competence in integration issues is complex in Spain. Integration is a cross­
cutting topic affecting several areas in which different levels of administration 
(national, regional and local) participate but in which there is a lack of multilevel 
governance mechanisms for collaboration. While matters relating to nationality, 
immigration, foreign nationals and the right to asylum are exclusive to the state, 
integration policies (employment, education, housing, health, social services etc.) 
are mainly devolved to the autonomous communities (in some policies, with full 
responsibility for legislating and implementing but, in others, just for implement­
ing). Almost all communities have, in recent years, implemented their own immi­
gration and integration policies and plans. Moreover, the local authorities have a 
competence that affects integration policies; in fact, there are several municipali­
ties which have their own local integration plan or a number of ongoing initiatives 
in this area. NGOs additionally play a role, providing services or collaborating 
with the different administrations (Morales et al. 2009). 
Lastly, to understand integration policies in Spain, the exceptionality of the 
Spanish Municipal Population Register (padrón) should be noted. Each town 
council is in charge of the creation, management and maintenance of its population 
register, containing personal data regulated by the law. The system of continuous 
and computerised management of municipal population registers was introduced 
in 1996; starting in 1998, population figures have been obtained (up to the first 
of January each year) which are declared official by the Council of Ministers (at 
the end of the year). In Spain, residents are entitled to public services by being on 
the municipal population register. Registration, or empadronamiento, is manda­
tory for all residents (on a permanent or a temporary basis) in the municipality, 













regardless of their legal status. On registering, all residents (nationals, immigrants 
and irregular migrants alike) receive a card that entitles them to full health cover­
age and access to education for their children. Even irregular immigrants who 
do not have a health card are treated in hospitals without being reported to the 
police. Political participation is also related to the padrón, as it is the register that 
provides data for the electoral census. 
Due to its exceptionality in the European scenario, the padrón has been con­
troversial, especially regarding irregular migrants. In 2003, for instance, a bill by 
the then-conservative majority in parliament authorised the police to use infor­
mation contained in the municipal registers to detect ‘unauthorised’ immigrants; 
however, this was met with widespread protest and there is no evidence that the 
plan was ever implemented. Furthermore, a legal reform passed in 2000 extended 
welfare benefits – health and education and, occasionally, other social benefits 
such as a basic income for vulnerable families – to irregular migrants. In 2012, 
the government adopted a legislative decree amending the law so that the health 
card was correlated to legal residence and affiliation in the social security pro-
gramme, thus limiting health care for irregular immigrants to minors below the 
age of 18, pregnant women or people in emergency situations. Several regional 
governments – such as those of Catalonia, Navarre, Andalusia and the Basque 
Country – in charge of health services, announced their refusal to comply, as 
did several medical associations. In 2015, the central government withdrew the 
decree and, in 2018, a new decree (Royal Legislative Decree 7/2018 of 27 July on 
universal access to the national health system) restoring universal access to health 
services was approved. In any case, this exceptional feature of the Spanish system 
was seldom questioned and has long been a widely accepted extension of registra­
tion to residents, including irregular migrants. 
The rule of the padrón could explain why, in Spain, the national, regional and 
local authorities have all emphasised the residence criteria as crucial in talks about 
integration and social cohesion. Residence is beyond origin and legal status and is 
conceived as the sum of real residence with the purpose of permanent settlement. 
This criterion appears in almost all local and autonomous community integration 
programmes. 
Building a common approach to integration? The role of 
central administration 
Migrants’ integration was not a part of any normative and political framework 
until the mid- 1990s. Until its accession to the European Community in 1986, 
Spain had neither an immigration policy nor an immigration law. In 1985, as a 
precondition for EC membership, the first Spanish immigration law was enacted: 
it was more a ‘requested’ law to meet EC standards than a real need (Pinyol-
Jiménez 2007). The first law on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain was 
passed in 1985 and was mainly focused on managing migration flows, while the 
first mention of migrant social integration in a parliamentary debate happened 
in 1991. It was in 1994 that the first Action Plan for Migrants’ Integration was 











approved. It aimed, among other objectives, to guarantee access to social services 
and benefits for the migrant population, to facilitate naturalisation processes for 
foreigners born in Spain and to acknowledge the role of native tongues for migrant 
children. In 2000, the Spanish Plan emphasised the importance of migrants’ inte­
gration, since which time the migratory law has been called ‘on the rights and 
freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration’. Also, in 2000, the 
Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes (Forum for the Social Integra­
tion of Migrants) was created as a consultative organism – composed of persons 
belonging to local and autonomous administrations, representatives of central 
government and representatives of immigration associations – to canalise discus­
sions and reflections on integration issues. 
In 2004, the creation of the Secretariat of State for Immigration and Emigration 
under the Ministry of Labour, with a General Direction on Integration, established 
a new approach to this topic, as responsibility for migration policies moved from 
the Home Affairs Ministry to Labour Affairs. Furthermore, in 2007, the Span­
ish government approved the first Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration 
(PECI-Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración) as a roadmap to guide pub­
lic administrations in dealing with integration issues. The PECI 2007–20102 was 
based on three main principles: equality and non-discrimination, citizenship and 
interculturality. The first equates the rights and obligations of the immigrant popu­
lation to those of the autochthonous population within the framework of basic 
constitutional values; the second entails recognition of the full civic, social, eco­
nomic, cultural and political participation of migrants and the latest aims to pro­
mote interaction between people of different origins or cultures, in a framework of 
respect for cultural diversity (Ferrero-Turrión and Pinyol-Jiménez 2009). 
In parallel, the Support Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants 
and their Educational Support was created in 2005. Its aim was to channel supple­
mentary funding to regions and municipalities with rapidly growing populations 
to support their provision of services to native and foreign residents in areas such 
as health care and education. The fund, which allocated assistance to autonomous 
communities to finance integration initiatives led by local authorities (it reached a 
peak of 200 million euros in 2007 and 2008) was created by the social democratic 
government; it ended in 2012 under the centre-right government. 
Up to the present day, the fund has never been reinstated, although social enti­
ties and subnational administrations have continuously requested its restoration. 
Certainly, the effects of the economic crisis and the cutting of funds were clear 
signs of the government’s priorities and main concerns as, during the former, all 
national financial support to regions and local authorities to deal with migrants’
integration was cut back, although resources were allocated to return programmes 
which never met expectations (Parella et al. 2014). 
The first plan was followed by a second PECI 2011–20143 which also empha­
sised the need to guarantee the full exercise of migrants’ civil, social, economic, 
political and cultural rights. The plans also sought to ensure access to public ser­
vices for the migrant population, along with the adaptation of public policies, par­
ticularly in education, employment, social services, health and housing, in order 










to meet the new needs of migrants in Spain and to combat discrimination and 
xenophobia. The PECI II was approved under the centre-left government but was 
poorly implemented under the centre-right, which did not replace it with a new 
plan after 2014. 
In 2017, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 
regretted that there lacked a national integration strategy in Spain after the end of 
PECI II in 2014 (ECRI 2018). At the same time, the ECRI Report (2018) pointed 
to the lack of data and indicators to evaluate the outcome of these integration 
plans. The absence of a coherent system of integration indicators made it very 
difficult to assess the migrants’ situation and to monitor the results and impacts of 
integration policies and instruments. Currently, the Spanish government is prepar­
ing a third PECI. 
Both previous PECI have had little impact in the different administrations and 
in public debate. It is difficult, due to the lack of clear impact indicators, to know 
the extent to which these plans have reconfigured the actions of the central admin­
istration regarding migrants’ integration, how much and in what way this integra­
tion has occurred and to what extent the plans have permeated the different social 
organisations, beyond those that have been directly involved. If the new PECI 
aims to become a roadmap rather than a general orientation framework, it must 
of necessity include a coherent system of integration indicators in areas such as 
education, employment, health and housing, and must evaluate and improve the 
impact of integration policies and instruments on such areas. 
The meso level: exploring the ‘Catalan’ way of integration 
Catalonia was traditionally a region of immigration, with important flows, mainly 
from southern regions of Spain, occurring during the 1960s, leading Catalan social 
entities (and, later, politicians) to consider the question of integration well before 
the issue was tackled at the Spanish level (Zapata-Barrero 2009). Considering its 
own culture, language and history, narratives on self-government, competence 
and identity have been present in the public debate in Catalonia which also had 
an impact on discussions of migrants’ integration at the public and political levels 
(Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero 2014). Civic residence was understood as a 
crucial part of Catalan society, regardless of nationality or place of birth.4 Differ­
ent instruments promoted by the Catalan government have highlighted the impor­
tant and positive contribution of migration to Catalonia and recognised its impact 
on the process of nation-building there. 
The first Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration was approved by the Catalan 
government in 19935 to promote the integration of immigrants in Catalonia and 
to facilitate their personal and social development, according to a framework of 
rights and obligations. This plan was a pioneer initiative in Spain and part of a 
process in which autonomous communities were progressively acquiring skill in 
areas such as education, health and social services; as such, the role of regional 
and, especially, local authorities in the integration of immigrants became clear 
(Pinyol-Jiménez 2013). 








In 2000, the Catalan government approved the second Interdepartmental Plan 
on Immigration, 2001–2004, managed by the newly created Secretariat for Immi­
gration. The plan stated the importance of migration into Catalonia, and the role 
of positive ‘living together’ in strengthening social cohesion; it also recognised 
a Catalan identity based on a shared culture and language. Both elements config­
ured the so-called Catalan way of integration, which tries to balance a respect for 
diversity with a sense of belonging to Catalan society and acquiring the Catalan 
language. 
The 2005–2008 Plan on Citizenship and Immigration emphasised the citizen­
ship concept by stating that residence was the only condition needed to be defined 
as a citizen and was thus the target of public policies. The plan was foreseen for all 
(resident) citizens without concern for their national origin, and integration was 
understood as a two-way process. The plan highlighted that the Catalan language 
and identity were the backbone of social cohesion, and that the latter had been 
enriched by newcomers, making all residents in Catalonia stronger, richer and of 
greater plurality. 
Following this plan, in 2008 the Catalan government approved the National 
Agreement on Immigration (Pacte Nacional de la Immigració) – also known as 
an ‘agreement to live together’. As opposed to earlier plans, this one searched for 
political and social consensus: the consultation process involved more than 1,500 
people and the agreement was endorsed by all but one political party in the Catalan 
parliament and by more than 70 associations from civil society. A renewed plan 
was approved for the 2009–2012 period and, in 2014, the new Citizenship and 
Migration Plan: Horizon 2016’ was ratified which focused on three main areas: 
immigration policies6 mainly focused on migrants’ accession to labour market, 
policies to encourage equal opportunities, and policies designed to foster integra­
tion and settlement in a common public culture. Currently, in 2019, the Catalan 
government is working on a new intercultural plan. 
Note that, since the 2008 agreement, the Catalan government has emphasised 
the idea of a ‘common public culture’, an interesting premise to link migration 
policies with nation-building, as took place for other national minorities in other 
Western countries (Zapata-Barrero 2009). From the beginning, the governmental 
narrative in Catalonia highlighted the need for instruments and policies to unite 
diverse groups through a shared sense of national identity. This notion implies 
encouraging participation in public life, making Catalan the common public lan­
guage, living together among a plurality of beliefs and ensuring equal opportu­
nities between men and women and, finally, incorporating inter alia the gender 
perspective.7 
To summarise the main trends of this policy process, the ‘Catalan way of 
integration’ understands diversity as a positive contribution to Catalan society, 
emphasises the Catalan language as a key element of social cohesion and a strate­
gic instrument to ensure equal opportunities, promotes a ‘living together’ model 
based on residence to ensure equal rights and duties, pays attention to youth (edu­
cation) to ensure social mobility and endorses a common public culture of integra­
tion. More recently, issues such as fighting discrimination and hate speech have 






also become priorities. In 2019, before the general, local and European elections, 
all parties in the Catalan parliament and several social entities approved an agree­
ment for living together and for avoiding the use of migration as a political tool 
in electoral campaigns. Parties have committed to defending democratic values, 
encouraging respect for diversity and avoiding the portrayal of migration as a 
threat to social cohesion. 
Zooming in on the final trends in the definition of integration policies 
in Spain: the role of local authorities 
While the overall picture of municipal policy efforts in Spain is highly complex, 
most cities with migrant populations have defined, designed and implemented a 
set of integration and diversity instruments with which to plug the gaps left by an 
undeveloped or inexistent national integration framework. At the local level, the 
main work focus has been on reception, education, employment, civic citizenship 
and social participation. It is worth mentioning that, despite the economic crisis 
and its impact on local budgets, cities (and regions) have generally endeavoured 
to provide public services to local residents, thus contributing to the fostering of 
social cohesion. However, beyond public service provision and welcome policies 
to facilitate integration, local authorities now face new challenges. 
Regarding civic participation, foreign nationals can only vote at the local level 
if they are EU residents or nationals from countries with which Spain has signed 
bilateral agreements This limitation goes counter to the integration notion pro­
moted by most local authorities – which promote equal access to rights, duties 
and opportunities for both nationals and foreigners. Aside from the right to vote, 
municipalities have engaged migrant populations in local politics by promoting 
forums or regional and local advisory committees. The active participation of 
the immigrant population in local neighbourhood associations and in schools 
(through parents’ associations), trade unions and professional associations as well 
as cultural, leisure and sports associations, is considered a priority. As a result, 
most social agents, immigrant associations and local governments tend to pro­
mote migrants’ engagement in the local community as a way to ensure a harmoni­
ous neighbourhood and inclusive citizenship beyond mere (and limited by law) 
political participation. 
In recent years, the different municipalities have also developed anti-
discrimination measures and awareness-raising actions to fight xenophobia. 
Several regional and local authorities have defined bodies or policies to combat 
racism and xenophobia, most of which involve information campaigns, advocacy, 
awareness-raising and training programmes for both public and private agents. 
In their role as cooperating organisations, NGOs also deploy actions in this area. 
Recently, the refugee question has also been introduced onto local agendas. The 
war in Syria and the humanitarian crisis created by the influx of displaced people 
have had a tremendous impact on a Spanish society unaccustomed to refugee and 
asylum issues. Several cities have traditionally had reception services and actions 
for refugees but, since 2015, more Spanish cities have spoken of their willingness 














to attend to and receive asylum-seekers and refugees. The asylum system in Spain 
is highly centralised and refugees’ care is provided by different national centres 
and several NGOs directly appointed for the purpose. Cities such as Barcelona 
and Madrid took the initiative to create a network of ‘safe cities’ to encourage 
people to assist refugees and asylum-seekers.8 Although, until today, the asylum 
system has remained unchanged and the role of cities dismissed despite their com­
promise and good will, the local authorities have become a clear voice asking for 
solidarity and respect for human rights for displaced people. 
Finally, the appearance in 2019 of a new far-right party in Spain on several 
municipal councils could affect the development of integration measures in vari­
ous regions and municipalities, although is too early to evaluate its impact. 
The multiplicity of actions developed at the local level complicates assessment 
of the role played by local authorities in terms of migrant integration, although its 
importance is unquestionable. Most cities with a foreign population have devel­
oped strategic plans for migrant integration, inclusion and citizenship, but the lack 
of shared indicators and evaluation grids disguises a general assessment of inte­
gration policies. In Spain, 20 municipalities are part of the RECI (Spanish Net­
work of Intercultural Cities) which is related to the Intercultural Cities programme 
of the Council of Europe: through the ICC Index a limited assessment of these 
cities’ performance in terms of intercultural development could be undertaken. 
In spite of existing policy, academic and public debates on multiculturalism and 
interculturalism are recent in Spain and take place basically at the local level, with 
the leadership of Barcelona (Zapata-Barrero 2017). 
Most cities have worked with a focus on citizenship, understanding it not as a 
question of national identity but of urban residence in a territory (Ferrero-Turrión 
and Pinyol-Jiménez 2009). Without being overconfident nor masking any current 
problems, this might explain why, with the considerable influx of migrants in 
a short period of time and without both a common approach to integration and 
enough resources, ‘living together’ in Spain has worked well enough. 
Final remarks 
Over a short period of time, Spain has had to confront new and different migra­
tion flows, to implement new responses and to look for new instruments and tools. 
During the earlier years of the twenty-first century, the main instruments were 
sketched out while, in recent years, integration has become the real challenge 
for Spanish society. Managing migration also implies the management of identi­
ties (Zapata-Barrero 2013) and, like other EU countries, Spain seeks to manage 
diversity and plurality without losing a common framework of identification and 
belonging. 
The Spanish approach to integration was born in a specific and complex context:
Spain is a country with its own cultural and regional diversity, of which migra­
tion has now become a part. Interestingly, as discussing internal diversity has been
always a conflictual issue in Spanish politics, integration philosophies to deal with
migration have been weaker than in other EU countries. The assimilation approach,



















    
understood as a person abandoning her/his identity to adopt local norms and values,
was present in most of the Spanish public instruments but in a weaker way, than,
for instance, the French case. At the same time, as in the multiculturalism approach,
the recognition of diversity is very much present in today’s Spain. This mixture of
approaches has been seen via different instruments and public actions, most of them
inspired by the intercultural approach at both national, regional and local levels.
Note, however, that, despite the use of interculturalism as a public approach, public
policies and instruments in Spain regarding integration could hardly be described as
intercultural. Even now it seems evident that the existence of a philosophy (or phi­
losophies) of integration in Spain is a debate located more in the academic sphere
than in the political or social scenario (Ferrero-Turrión and Pinyol-Jiménez 2009). 
Furthermore, in Spain, the lack of evidence-based data complicates assump­
tions about the impacts, outcomes and results of integration policies developed 
at all administration levels. Similarly, there are several areas in which integration 
topics should be redefined and multilevel governance better defined. The current 
set of bodies and instruments for the promotion of multilevel cooperation are 
far from working properly. As most integration policies are handled by regional 
governments and local authorities, the role of central government could be both 
to define a set of principles or guidelines which would promote and guarantee a 
homogeneous approach to integration in Spain, and to support other administra­
tions in developing policies and instruments to fit it. The role of regional and local 
authorities should be strengthened, better coordinated and better funded. These 
administrations are key regarding integration policies, as they are designed to 
deal with the incorporation of a new and diverse citizenship in order not to simply 
avoid a negative impact in the maintenance of social cohesion and also to use their 
benefits and contributions to local development. 
In Spain, the debates on migration, citizenship and national community are still
open; however, they are indispensable to in-depth discussion. Talking about what
kind of society the Spanish one is and will be will define the boundaries of the pub­
lic philosophy of integration. Within this framework, the instruments, policies and
actions required to manage plurality and diversity should be identified in order to
guarantee social cohesion and peacefully living together in a decentralised Spain. 
Finally, this chapter has provided some evidence that the Spanish case con­
firms the multilevel governance’s argument that migration policies at the admis­
sions level and in the hands of central government, and integration policies under 
the decision-making of sub-state administration, are two arenas that mostly work 
independently and without structures ensuring cooperation and coordination. It 
is at this point that most of the tensions arise in Spain. The concrete case of local 
registration is just one illustration of the tensions between two policy narratives 
that often collapse and make explicit the fact that local claims for integration work 
better for decentralisation processes. 
Notes 
1 Organic Law (LO) 4/2000 has been modified by LO 8/2000, LO 14/2003, LO 2/2009, 
LO 10/2011 and RDL 16/2012; see www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2000-
544&p=20180904&tn=6. Regarding foreign residents, this LO is also complemented 





   
  
   
   
  
   














by the Royal Decree 240/2007 of 16 February 2007 on the entry, free movement and 
residence in Spain of citizens of the EU and EEA member-states. Asylum is regulated by 
Law 12/2009 of 30 October 2009 governing the right of asylum and subsidiary protec­
tion. Rules on citizenship are set out in the Civil Code. 




4 In the 1980s, the-then Catalan president coined the axiom: ‘Is Catalan everybody who 
lives and works in Catalonia and wants to be?’ 
5 See http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_tematics/immigracio/politiques_i_plans_
dactuacio/antecedents/ 
6 As in most EU countries, issues regarding migration policies in terms of accession to the 
territory, border control, permits etc. are a national competence. 
7 See http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/web/.content/03ambits_tematics/05immigracio_
refugi/03politiquesplansactuacio/continguts/Document_final_PNI_angles.pdf 
8 See, for instance, Barcelona’s initiative of Ciutat Refugi or City of Refuge (http://ciut
atrefugi.barcelona/). 
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